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TIME, DURATION AND FREEDOM 
– BERGSON’S CRITICAL MOVE AGAINST KANT
– Arjen Kleinherenbrink –
Abstract. Research into Bergson’s philosophy downplays a key development in his first work, 
Time and free will. It is there that Bergson explicitly opposes himself to Kant by arguing that 
succession is not a temporal concept, but a spatial one. This is the crucial point of departure for 
Bergson’s entire philosophy, one that allows him to radically dismiss Kant’s notion of freedom in 
favor of one based on duration and multiplicity. This text has two aims. Firstly to add to Bergson 
scholarship by explicating the structure and force of Bergson’s initial argument against Kant, 
demonstrating that his engagement with Kant is much less incremental than has been suggested in 
secondary literature. Secondly, to reconstruct the consequences regarding freedom that Bergson 
immediately draws in departing from Kant, which illustrates the profundity and originality of his 
thought at the very inception of his oeuvre. 
Keywords: Time, duration, freedom, Kant, Bergson. 
After decades of relative obscurity, recent years are seeing a resurgence of 
interest in the works of Henri Bergson.1 Previously seen primarily as an 
inspiration to philosophers such as Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty, he is now 
increasingly being acknowledged as the creator of a profound system in its own 
right. However, research into Bergson’s philosophy tends to overlook or 
downplay a key development in his first work, the essay Time and free will. 
There, Bergson explicitly opposes himself to Kant by arguing succession is not 
a temporal concept, but a spatial one. This is the crucial point of departure for 
Bergson’s further philosophy, allowing him to radically dismiss Kant’s notion of 
freedom in favor of one based on duration and multiplicity, central concepts in all 
of Bergson’s later work. Consequently, this text has two aims. The first is to add to 
Bergson scholarship by explicating the structure and force of Bergson’s argument 
1 This is especially true for the Anglo-Saxon reception. Renewed interest in Bergson started in the 
late nineties, spearheaded by John Mullarkey (especially his excellent edited volume The new 
Bergson) and Keith Ansell Pearson (see the bibliography for relevant titles). The book by 
Kolakowski [1985] is a forerunner of this revival. For more on the waxing and waning of interest in 
Bergson, see the introductions by Guerlac [2006] and Gunter [2005]. 
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against Kant in Time and free will, demonstrating that his engagement with Kant 
is less incremental than has been suggested in secondary literature. In tandem 
with this, the second aim is to reconstruct the consequences that Bergson’s 
departure from Kant has for the concept of freedom, so as to illustrate the 
profundity and originality of Bergson’s thought at the very inception of his 
oeuvre. 
What spurs a great philosopher to radically deviate from established modes 
of thought? How is he launched into the creation of his own concepts? What 
motivates one such as Bergson to create remarkable concepts such as duration, 
multiplicity, becoming, and their corresponding investigations into subjects as 
diverse as morality, religion and evolution? Deleuze, perhaps the contemporary 
philosophers most fascinated by Bergson’s work, insisted such questioning is 
necessary to fully appreciate a philosopher, because it forces us to put his concepts 
into a proper sequence: ‘…and if you don’t understand the sequence of which 
a concept is part, you cannot understand the concept.’2 So we can ask, what might 
be the catalyst for Bergson, or the point from which his particular sequence of 
concepts emerges? 
It is no secret that Bergson’s relates intimately to Kant. It has often been said 
how Kant’s system is a continuous counterpoint to Bergson’s philosophical labors, 
that ‘scattered throughout Bergson’s writings one finds an engagement with the 
legacy of Kant’s Copernican Revolution’ and that ‘one could look upon Bergson’s 
philosophy in general as a reversed Kantianism.’3 However, I would claim that the 
attention to engagements with Kant throughout Bergson’s writings 
underapprecias the critical move that the latter makes against the former at the 
very inception of his thought: to claim that succession is not a temporal notion, as 
Kant would have it, but a spatial one.4 It is from this single deviation from Kant, 
                                                 
2 Deleuze [1980]. For Deleuze’s relation to Bergson, see the section ‘Becoming-Intense, Becoming- 
-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible’ in Deleuze, Guattari [1987], the sections ‘Theses on movement: 
first commentary on Bergson’ and ‘The movement-image and its three varieties: second 
commentary on Bergson’ in Deleuze [1986], the essays Bergson, 1859–1941 and Bergson’s 
conception of difference in Deleuze [2004] and the whole of Deleuze’s Bergsonism [1988]. For 
Merleau-Ponty’s relation to Bergson, see his various essays and lectures on Bergson [1964, 1988, 
2001]. 
3 Ansell Pearson and Mullarkey [2002] p. 32; Mullarkey [2000] p. 115. The introduction to Ansell 
Pearson, Mullarkey [2002], chapter five of Ansell Pearson [2002], and especially the book by 
Barthélemy-Madaule [1966] contain highly interesting elaborations on Kant’s general influence 
throughout Bergson’s oeuvre. As the latter states: ‘‘Kant est son adversaire de toujours; de l’Essai 
sur les données immédiates aux Deux sources de la morale et de la religion, Bergson est resté fidèle 
à lui-même dans cette animadversion’ [1966] p. 4. 
4 To illustrate: in Ansell Pearson and Mullarkey’s Henri Bergson – key writings, the discussion of 
Time and free will does not mention Kant, instead preferring to compare Russell and Bergson on 
the topic of continuity. When Kant is discussed, it is in the light of Bergson’s later works Creative 
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performed in Bergson’s first publication Time and free will, that subsequent 
concepts such as duration, multiplicity and becoming derive their sense and 
purpose.5 Hence there are two reasons for writing the present text. Firstly, to add 
to existing scholarship on Bergson by underlining the foundational role of his 
specific departure from Kant in Time and free will, something which tends to be 
overlooked. This might contribute to a less skewed interpretation of Bergson’s 
relation to Kant.6 As the text will demonstrate, Bergson’s engagement with Kant is 
not incremental. Rather, it results from one singular rupture, a Bergsonian ‘master 
stroke’ that allows him to escape the limits of Kantianism and set off on 
a development of his own concepts. Secondly, a reconstruction of Bergson’s notion 
of free will, based upon his rethinking of time, will illustrate how his early break 
with Kant has immediate consequences that reach far beyond a discussion of time 
and space itself, and that will resonate throughout his later works.7 
1. Kant on time and nature 
A significant difference between Kant and his predecessors is that he no longer 
defines space as the order of coexistences and time as the order of successions.8 
Kant seeks to demonstrate that coexistence is a temporal notion, a modality of 
time as much as permanence and simultaneity. In themselves, he famously 
                                                                                                                                                    
evolution, Matter and memory, and The creative mind. Similarly, even the section titled The 
antinomies of time in Mullarkey’s Bergson and philosophy never explicitly mentions Kant. As 
a final example, Ansell Pearson’s highly recommendable work Philosophy and the adventure of 
the virtual also tends to discuss Bergson’s engagement with Kant almost exclusively in the light of 
Create evolution. Strikingly, commentators in his own time already overlooked how Bergson 
overturns the Kantian notion of time in Time and free will, and criticized Bergson’s concepts for 
being entirely irrational from a Kantian perspective, missing the point that it is precisely from 
a break with Kantianism that his concepts result in the first place (Jordan [1912]; Watts 
Cunningham [1914]). 
5 This point is acknowledged in recent French publications on Bergson, for example when Worms 
states ‘‘Bref, la distinction entre la durée et l’espace donne lieu dans l’oeuvre de Bergson à un 
mouvement qui conduit vers une philosophie de la vie, de l’univers, de la morale et de la 
religion…’, [2009] p. 39. Even in Duration and simultaneity, published thirty-three years after Time 
and free will, Bergson clearly emphasizes how his initial move of disengaging succession from 
temporality (and hence from simultaneity) underlies all of his work. 
6 Bergson must be considered as much of a post-Kantian as Schelling or Fichte, in the sense that his 
philosophical endeavors start by an augmentation of Kant through Kant himself. It was Kant who 
demonstrated that space was not the order of coexistences, and it is Bergson who demands further 
precision by, in turn, reproaching Kant for still maintaining that time included a modality of 
succession. As such, this text might contribute to the ‘correction of Bergson’s erasure from our 
image of post-Kantian philosophy’ (Ansell Pearson [2002] p. 2). 
7 Bergson immediately realizes in Time and free will that his new conception of time allows him to 
redefine not just Kant’s notion of freedom, but the entire debate on freedom up to that point, 
concerning determinists and compatibilists alike (‘mechanists’ and ‘dynamists’ in Bergson’s terms). 
8 Deleuze [1980]. 
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concludes, space and time are nothing but empty forms through which 
phenomena are apperceived.9 Therefore, our daily experience is one of being ‘in 
the centre of a spatially extended world, travelling equably and unidirectionally 
[…] along a temporal extension.’10 Time, in this view, stretches into infinity and 
can be chopped up into discrete parts. The present of the phenomenal world must 
be thought as a narrow temporal slice, extending ad infinitum in space, yet 
restricted to the shortest possible discrete moment of time. This implies thinking in 
terms of ‘quantities of time’ that succeed each other.11 Indeed, Kant argues that 
‘[we] represent the course of time by a line progressing to infinity, the content of 
which constitutes a series which is only of one dimension, and we conclude from 
the properties of this line as to all the properties of time.’12 Time being ‘of one 
dimension’, it is a homogeneous medium much akin to space. For Kant, ‘causality 
is the relationship between events on [that] time continuum.’13 
 Given Kant’s conception of time, freedom in nature becomes outright 
impossible, as every single action necessarily results from earlier states of affairs in 
the world.14 Every event in nature will be caused by previous conditions which are 
themselves caused by previous conditions, ad infinitum. Human actions, 
thoughts, and desires are no exception to this rule, leading Kant to famously 
dismiss any notion of freedom situated fully within a deterministic world as 
a ‘wretched subterfuge’, granting an agent no more freedom than a ball once 
thrown. Kant emphasizes that 
[...] as the causality of phenomena is subject to conditions of time, and the 
preceding state, if it had always existed, could not have produced an effect which 
would make its first appearance at a particular time, the causality of the cause 
                                                 
9 A precise exposition of this departure from philosophical tradition is beyond the scope of this 
text. One of the most interesting comparisons concerning this topic can be found in Deleuze’s 1980 
and 1987 seminars on Leibniz, in which Kant and Leibniz are contrasted concerning their concepts 
of space. Especially worth mentioning is the seminar of 20.05.1980 (Deleuze [1980]). 
10 Beets [1988] p. 3. 
11 Cpur A32/B49. 
12 Cpur A33/B50. 
13 Beets [1988] p. 7. 
14 Kant’s  analysis of freedom as presented here is mainly based on the arguments found in the 
Critique of pure reason [1998], the Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals [1959] and 
the Critique of practical reason [1956]. These works will be referred to as ‘Cpur’, ‘G’, and ‘Cpra’, 
respectively. Kant’s Religion within the limits of reason alone contains an elaboration of his theory 
of freedom and addresses problems such as ‘why would I ascribe to the categorical imperative?’ 
and ‘how can we be immoral?’. However, since the Religion contains no significant changes to the 
structure of Kant’s conception of freedom (Guyer [2005]), the work is considered to be outside 
the scope of this text. 
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must itself be an effect – must itself have begun to be, and therefore […] itself 
requires a cause.15 
As he considers all events in the phenomenal world to be necessarily 
predetermined, Kant, in order to preserve room for the possibility of freedom, 
requires a theory that allows him to ‘ascribe the existence of a thing so far as it is 
determinable in time, and so too its causality with the law of natural necessity, 
only to appearance, and to ascribe freedom to the same being as a thing in itself.’16 
In other words, the idea of freedom requires something external to the natural 
realm of phenomena: the noumenal realm containing the things that phenomena, 
as mere appearances, are appearances of. If there is nothing beyond phenomena as 
they appear to us, then there is no such thing as freedom: ‘if phenomena are things 
in themselves, freedom is impossible.’17 This requires a subtle theory of freedom, 
as freedom must now become the ability to have an effect on the series of events in 
the natural world without entering into the causal chain of that natural world. It 
requires a type of causality separate from phenomena, yet guaranteed to be their 
cause in some meaningful sense. As Kant explains: 
[...] we must understand […] by the term freedom […] a faculty of the spontaneous 
origination of a state; the causality of which […] is not subordinated to another 
cause determining it in time. Freedom is in this sense a pure transcendental idea, 
which, in the first place, contains no empirical element; the object of which, in the 
second place, cannot be given or determined in any experience, because it is 
a universal law of the very possibility of experience, that everything which 
happens must have a cause, that consequently the causality of a cause, being itself 
something that has happened, must also have a cause.18 
It is worth emphasizing that above all else, Kant makes his move to transcendental 
freedom because there is time in nature. He emphasizes that ‘[a free subject] 
would be subordinate to no conditions of time, for time is only a condition of 
phenomena,’19 that ‘no action would begin or cease to be in [a free] subject; it 
would consequently be free from the law of all determination of time,’20 and that 
                                                 
15 Cpur A532/B560, emphasis added; cf. A534/B562. 
16 Guyer [2009] p. 195–196. 
17 Cpur A536/B564. 
18 Ibidem, A533/B561. 
19 Cpur A539/B567. 
20 Ibidem, A540/B567. 
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freedom is only conceivable because ‘time is only a condition of phenomena, not 
of things in themselves.’21 
Kant seeks to escape time and nature in order to explain how we would be 
able to conceive of freedom. As is often noted in the relevant literature, Kant’s 
work contains several lines of arguments through which he arrives at his theory of 
freedom. One author goes so far as to despair over the ‘bewildering number 
of ways in which Kant characterizes freedom.’22 There are, however, two lines of 
argument concerning freedom usually interpreted as being the most relevant.23 To 
show how Kant’s theory of freedom always retains the basic assumptions 
concerning time in nature, a concise account of both arguments follows. This will 
also serve to demonstrates how Bergson’s critique does not merely concern one 
reading of Kant, but his philosophy as such. 
2. The first argument: from transcendental idealism to freedom 
The first argument is found in the Critique of pure reason and the 
Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, in which Kant ventures forth from 
the idea of transcendental idealism.24 This is the idea that phenomena registered 
by our senses are mere appearances. Hence, there must be more to reality than just 
nature and the way in which phenomena succeed one another in time: there must 
be things which appearances are appearances of. These things in themselves (the 
noumena) provide the possibility that ‘the history of our behavior in time, and 
the natural laws that hold sway here, are all a matter of appearance, and that, as 
we are in ourselves, we may always be able to initiate any course of action, 
regardless of the appearance of our histories and the natural laws of behavior.’25 
Kant emphasizes that transcendental idealism is a given, stating that it is 
a ‘conclusion [to which] a thinking man must come.’26 Kant therefore posits 
transcendental idealism as the basic idea from which a further theory of freedom 
can be deduced. After all, if transcendental idealism is even possible, then ‘no one 
can prove that determinism in the empirical world amounts to the whole truth 
about human existence.’27 
 According to Kant, the very fact that one can conceive of transcendental 
idealism grounds the rationality of human beings. One cannot arrive at the idea of 
                                                 
21 Ibidem, A539/B567. 
22 Allison [1990] p. 1. 
23 Velkley [1989]; Guyer [1993]; Rauscher [2009]. 
24 Guyer [2009]. 
25 Guyer [2005] p. 122. 
26 G 452, emphasis added. 
27 Guyer [2007] p. 167. 
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transcendental idealism through the senses, as it, by definition, transcends the 
sensible world. This means that where there is the idea of transcendental idealism, 
there must also be the faculty of reason, that is, the faculty that provides ‘the 
ability to form transcendental ideas of things that are grounds for other things.’28 
For Kant, reason ‘compels’ human beings to think transcendental objects and 
subjects.29 Consequently, human rationality is proven by the ability to think 
transcendental idealism and anything that applies to rational beings, applies to us 
humans. This divides human cognitive powers ‘into the ‘lower’ power of 
sensibility and the ‘higher’ power of intellect.’30 Through our rationality we 
recognize our membership of not just the sensible world of phenomena, but also 
of the intelligible world of noumena. As Kant argues: 
[...] man […] cognizes himself not only by his senses, but also through pure 
apperception […] He is thus to himself, on the one hand, a phenomenon, but on 
the other hand, in respect of [reason], a purely intelligible subject – intelligible, 
because its action cannot be ascribed to sensuous receptivity.’31  
From transcendental idealism and the rationality it grounds, a conception 
of freedom emerges. Rational beings are beings that regard themselves as acting 
according to reasons. This, as opposed to acting on impulse, means that rational 
beings perceive themselves as the authors of their actions. As a consequence, they 
must consider themselves free, since only under the idea of freedom can the will 
of a rational being be conceived of as being a will of its own. Kant first asserts that 
freedom would amount to actions not being necessitated by sensuous inputs: ‘as 
will is a kind of causality of living beings so far as they are rational, freedom 
would be that property of this causality by which it can be effective independently 
of foreign causes determining it.’32 This is a negative conception of freedom, 
a conception of what it should not be. It is practical freedom, emphasizing that 
humans have what Kant calls arbitrium liberum, as opposed to arbitrium brutum. 
The latter concerns actions that are necessitated by sensuous inputs, whereas the 
former amounts to ‘freedom [as] the independence of the will of coercion by 
sensuous impulses.’33 From this follows a positive conception of freedom that is 
based on ‘causality according to immutable laws, but of a peculiar kind.’34 This 
                                                 
28 Ibidem, p. 29. 
29 Cpur A533/B561. 
30 Guyer [2007] p. 29. 
31 Cpur A546/B574–A547/B575. 
32 G 446. 
33 Cpur A534/B562. 
34 Ibidem. 
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is the transcendental freedom that warrants autonomy, that is, the freedom of the 
will in the sense of being subject to laws given by itself but still universal.35 
The ‘peculiar kind’ of law is the moral law, or as Kant clearly states: 
[...] the proposition ‘Will is in all its actions a law to itself’ expresses […] the 
principle of acting on no maxim other than one which can have for its object itself 
as at the same time a universal law […] thus free will and a will under moral laws 
are one and the same.’36  
This results in two types of causality, the first being that of nature, the 
second being that of free will in the sense of reason initiating a series of events by 
adhering to the moral law of the categorical imperative. As Kant puts it: ‘the 
question, therefore is, whether an effect, determined according to the laws of 
nature, can at the same time be produced by a free agent, or whether freedom and 
nature mutually exclude each other.’37 Kant’s answer is that as phenomena, all 
things are subject to the causality of nature, yet simultaneously, rational beings 
belonging to the intelligible world of the noumena can be conceived of as 
exercising a ‘non empirical and intelligible causality […] which is […] not 
phenomenal […] although it must, at the same time, as a link in the chain of 
nature, be regarded as belonging to the sensuous world.’38 As Guyer states it, 
though the determining grounds of intelligible causality are not found within the 
world, their effect nevertheless should take place in the world.39 
This concludes the first argument to show how human beings can conceive 
of freedom. Having the idea of transcendental idealism grounds human 
rationality. Rationality makes us think ourselves as originators of our actions. 
Rational beings can therefore think that they belong to an intelligible world that is 
independent from the necessary determination of events in nature. From this 
practical notion of freedom follows a conception of transcendental freedom: 
through rationality, the will can willingly subject itself to universal law, that is, the 
moral law of the categorical imperative. In this conception of the idea of freedom, 
rational beings can be free, because even though all events in nature are 
predetermined, reason ‘will not follow the order of things presented by 
experience, but, with perfect spontaneity, rearranges them according to ideas, with 
                                                 
35 G 447. 
36 Ibidem, 446–447. 
37 Cpur A536/B564. 
38 Ibidem, A544/B572. 
39 Guyer [1993] p. 27. 
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which it compels empirical conditions to agree.’40 To summarize: one can conceive 
of freedom thanks to the ability of adhering to an intelligible realm, granted by 
rationality, thus willingly subjecting oneself to the universal moral law ‘under the 
sign of which’ our actions in nature unfold. It is, therefore, in the intelligible world 
that man is his ‘proper self’.41 As Guyer puts it: 
[...] the free agency of the noumenal self could not be seen as intervening in 
particular moments in the history of the phenomenal world, but we could 
nevertheless rest assured in the conviction that the phenomenal realm of nature as 
a whole is always subject to the freedom of the will, no matter how recalcitrant to 
the demands of practical reason any sequence of events in the natural formation of 
a character might otherwise seem […]. Freedom of our will implies total control 
over the phenomenal realm, in spite of […] the total subjection of the latter to 
causal laws of nature.42 
3. The second argument: from moral law to freedom 
The argument for freedom in Critique of practical reason is different from 
that in Critique of pure reason and the Groundwork.43 Here it is not 
transcendental idealism, but the moral law which is argued to require no 
deduction, thus coming to function as the departing point for a theory of 
freedom.44 Where the Critique of pure reason and the Groundwork argue for the 
mere possibility of the conception of the idea of freedom, the Critique of practical 
reason argues ‘that purely rational cognition of the practical laws of freedom 
implies the actual existence of free will.’45 Kant argues that humans, being rational, 
can conceive of the universal moral law of the categorical imperative: the moral 
law ‘is declared by reason to be a law for all rational beings in so far as they have 
a will.’46 One can act according to the imperatives of reason, as opposed to the 
contingent inclinations caused by sensuous inputs. The idea of an ‘ought’ is not 
found in nature, as nature is only concerned with what ‘is’. The idea of the moral 
law provides a ‘way out’ of nature and necessitated succession of events in time, 
as its universal character renders it immune to any contingency. As with 
transcendental idealism, the existence of the moral law grounds our being rational, 
                                                 
40 Cpur A548/B567. 
41 G 457. 
42 Guyer [1993] p. 29. 
43 Guyer [2009]. 
44 Rauscher [2009] p. 203. 
45 Guyer [1993] p. 29. 
46 Cpra A57 
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as only the faculty of rationality would be able to conceive of something outside of 
nature: the form of a law can only be thought by reason and is not an object of the 
senses.47 As Guyer states, both arguments essentially show how a conception of 
freedom flows forth from rationality. The difference between the arguments is that 
in the first, our rationality is proven by the fact that we can conceive of noumena, 
whereas in the second it is proven by the fact that we can conceive of a universal 
moral law that exists independently of contingent events in nature.  
Because the universal legislative form can be the determining ground for 
the will, it is independent from natural law. Such independence is then called 
freedom in the strictest, transcendental sense. As Kant states it: ‘a free will [finds] 
its ground of determination in the law.’48 We are free when we act in accordance 
with this universal law, when we ‘so act that the maxim of your will could always 
hold at the same time as a principle establishing universal law.’49 Naturally, any 
such action would still unfold in the phenomenal realm, but it would be free 
because it adheres to the moral law. As subsequent authors have noted, Kant now 
equates moral law as pure practical reason with pure will, meaning that moral law 
and freedom imply one another.50 
4. From Kant to Bergson 
The entire edifice of Kant’s theory of freedom rests upon the assumption 
that freedom cannot exist within nature, because there, events necessarily succeed 
one another in time.51 In this sense, Kant’s arguments mentioned earlier are alike 
                                                 
47 Guyer [2005] p. 124. 
48 Cpra A52. 
49 Ibidem, A54. 
50 Beets [1988]; Guyer [2009]. 
51 It will be noted that there are remarkable points within Kant’s critical project in which time is 
treated differently. One notable moment is Cpur B158, in which Kant asserts that ‘In order for that 
manifold to be given, self-intuition is required, and at the basis of this self-intuition lies a form 
given a priori, viz. time, which is sensible and belongs to the ability to receive the determinable. 
[…] I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being; instead I present only the 
spontaneity of my thought, i.e. of the [act of] determination, and my existence remains 
determinable always only sensibly i.e. as the existence of an appearance’. Here, time becomes the 
form under which undetermined existence is determinable. When one takes this as the ‘lens’ 
through which to read the Critical project, everything changes. Arguably, Deleuze’s entire 
ontology as set out in Difference and repetition is the result of precisely such a move. In his words: 
‘The consequences of this are extreme: my undetermined existence can be determined only within 
time as the existence of a phenomenon, of a passive, receptive phenomenal subject appearing 
within time. As a result, the spontaneity of which I am conscious in the ‘I think’ cannot be 
understood as the attribute of a substantial and spontaneous being, but only as the affection of a 
passive self which experiences its own thought – its own intelligence, that by virtue of which it can 
say I – being exercised in it and upon it but not by it. Here begins a long and inexhaustible story: 
I is another, or the paradox of inner sense’ ([1994] p. 86). Obviously, this radically alters the 
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in arriving at a radically transcendental notion of freedom.52 For freedom, an 
entire transcendental and intelligible world is required, independent from and yet 
influencing the natural world. As Guyer emphasizes: 
[...] to carry Kant’s thought to completion, everything in the phenomenal world 
that would appear to be a determinant of an agent’s actions must in fact be 
a reflection of his noumenal choice, so […] the laws of his character which link his 
prior condition to his present choices must in fact reflect his noumenal will.53 
Bergson uses Kant’s theory as a catalyst to demonstrate how the entire debate on 
free will rests on a flawed conception of time. As stated, Bergson’s move consists 
of arguing, against Kant, that succession is not a temporal notion and immediately 
demonstrating the consequences of that insight for our notion of freedom.54 
Bergson uses three distinct steps to form an argument for the existence of real time 
(duration) and real freedom (freedom in duration), seeking to demonstrate why 
one does not need a realm outside nature for freedom, simply because there is no 
such thing as homogeneous time in nature, except as an artificial, man-made 
construct that has very little if not nothing to do with what living beings truly are. 
If Bergson’s argument holds, he will have shown why Kant’s theory of freedom is 
pointless, as its very point of departure (‘escape time in nature’) would be invalid. 
The three steps of his argument are 1) an argument concerning intensity and 
magnitude, 2) an argument concerning multiplicity and duration, and 3) 
a concluding argument concerning freedom of the will. 
5. Intensity and magnitude 
We usually think that a sensation, which for Bergson is anything 
experienced by the mind, including the ‘effort’ of physical tasks, can grow and 
diminish in intensity, that we can become ‘twice as angry’ or that we can ‘double 
our effort’. Intensity, then, is a property of a sensation in consciousness. It is 
common sense that leads to thinking in these terms of intensive magnitudes: the 
                                                                                                                                                    
standard reading of the Critiques as the chronicles of the sovereign, synthesizing subject. However, 
unorthodox readings of Kant resulting from this passage and others, ones in which Kant is already 
closer to Bergson than either of them would be willing to admit, are obviously not the mainstream 
interpretation and not the most impactful interpretations of Kant, and it is the latter with which the 
present text is concerned. It is, after all, more instructive and interesting to lay out the differences 
and contrasts between philosophers than to merge them into a Bergsonian Kant and a Kantian 
Bergson. 
52 Guyer [2009] p. 179; Beets [1988] p. 73; Velkley [1989] p. 89. 
53 Guyer [2009] p. 196. 
54 ‘If we introduce an order in what is successive, the reason is that succession is converted into 
simultaneity and is projected into space’ (Bergson [2001] p. 102). 
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more intense a sensation becomes, the ‘bigger’ we call it, thus ascribing quantity to 
it. Quantity, Bergson argues, is based on the ‘principle of container and 
contained.’55 It is based on the idea of the less being inside the more, which also 
entails that quantities are divisible and therefore extended by nature (‘three’ 
containing three distinct units of ‘one’, with each unit of ‘one’ being divisible into 
ten discrete ‘tenths’). However, Bergson argues that the view of sensations as 
intensive magnitudes (quantities) is seriously mistaken, and through a series of 
examples ventures to bring forth the true nature of the intensity of our sensations. 
 Starting with the sensation of ‘effort’, Bergson invites us to press our lips 
together, first slightly, then tighter and finally as tight as possible. Such a process 
is usually conceived in terms of an quantitative increase in the same medium: lips 
are pressed together increasingly tight. However, Bergson argues that upon closer 
examination, something entirely different is happening. What really happens is 
that more and more elements are being added to the pressing together of the lips. 
As we try to press harder, more parts of the lips get involved, then the cheeks, the 
jaws, the tongue, the muscles in the neck, the skin below the eyes and, eventually, 
the entire cranium. Alternatively, but less recommendable, Bergson invites us to 
prick a pin into our hand more and more deeply: 
[...] at first we shall feel as it were a tickling, then a touch which is succeeded by 
a prick, then a pain localized at a point, and finally the spreading of this pain over 
the surrounding zone. We are dealing with [many] qualitatively distinct 
sensations, so many varieties of a single species.56 
Continuing with the sensation of pain, he argues that as pain becomes more 
intense, 
[...] consciousness distinguishes a larger […] number of sensations arising at 
different points […], muscular contractions, organic movements of every kind: the 
choir of these elementary psychic states voices the new demands of the organism 
[…] in other words, we estimate the intensity of a pain by the larger or smaller part 
of the organism which takes interest in it […] we should define the intensity of the 
pain by the very number and extent of the parts of the body which sympathize 
with it and react, and whose reactions are perceived by consciousness.57 
                                                 
55 Ibidem, p. 3. 
56 Ibidem, p. 42. 
57 Ibidem, p. 35–36. 
Arjen Kleinherenbrink ◦ Time, duration and freedom – Bergson’s critical move against... 
 215 
He concludes that what we usually call an increased quantity of one singular 
sensation, is in reality a process of additional qualitatively distinct sensations 
‘entering the mix’. 
 It is the same with emotions as with effort. Bergson argues there is no such 
thing as a singular emotion increasing in quantity (magnitude). What happens 
when we say that an emotion becomes more intense, is that more qualitatively 
distinct elements are becoming involved. Citing a description by Charles Darwin, 
Bergson points out that in anger 
[...] the action of the heart is much accelerated […] the face reddens or may turn 
deadly pale. The respiration is labored, the chest heaves, and the dilated nostrils 
quiver. The whole body often trembles. The voice is affected. The teeth are 
clenched or ground together and the muscular system is commonly stimulated to 
violent, almost frantic action.58 
In another example, Bergson examines the notion of pity, arguing that it starts by 
mentally putting oneself in the place of another, after which the horror of realizing 
his predicament is added, then the need of helping him, the dread of evil, a desire 
to share the suffering of others, self-abasement, generosity, et cetera, showing that 
‘the increasing intensity of pity thus consists in a qualitative progress.’59 
 With these examples, Bergson demonstrates that sensations are not things 
of quantity. We tend to think so because the causes of sensations are often 
extensive magnitudes, leading us to ‘associate the idea of a certain quantity of 
a cause with a certain quality of effect; and […] we transfer the idea into the 
sensation, the quantity of the cause into the quantity of the effect.’60 Rather, the 
singular names we use to designate sensations are born from the demands of 
language and from practical considerations concerning everyday life, but they do 
not reflect the true nature of sensations.  
Bergson also argues that distinguishing sensations from each other with 
language can only happen in retrospect: ‘strictly speaking [sensations] do not 
constitute multiple states until I have already got beyond them, and turn around 
to observe their trail. […] In reality none of them do begin or end; they all dove- 
-tail into one another.’61 The intensity of sensations is a thing of quality, 
a ‘multiplicity of simple states which consciousness dimly discerns in them.’62 This 
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is, in turn, also true for those simple states. What we call an element of ‘horror’ in 
‘pity’ is nothing but the linguistic representation for another multiplicity of simple 
states. The names of our sensations do not refer to distinct things. According to 
Bergson, they refer to a collection (‘multiplicity’) of qualitatively different 
(‘heterogeneous’), permeating (‘not clearly discernible’) states. Indeed, if one was 
to remove all qualitatively distinct sensations that perceived in a thing such as 
‘anger’, then all that remains is a mere ‘intellectual representation’.63 What really 
happens when the intensity of a sensation increases, is that it ‘little by little […] 
permeates a larger number of psychic elements, tingeing them, so to speak, with 
its own color’, or alternatively ‘[alters] the shade of a thousand perceptions or 
memories, and in this sense it pervades them.’64 Understandably, the 
‘contamination’ of sensation by language and practical necessity creates 
a methodological problem for Bergson. He continuously struggles with the 
limitations of (space-bound) language. When he argues, as will be shown, that 
conscious states are organized into a whole, permeate one another and gradually 
gain richer content, he has to use the spatial terminology of number with the 
words ‘several’ and ‘one another’. As such, ‘these terms are thus misleading from 
the very beginning, and the idea of a multiplicity without relation to number or 
space, although clear for pure reflective thought, cannot be translated into the 
language of common sense.’65 
This concludes the first step of Bergson’s argument. He shows that when 
sensations become more intense, they do not themselves increase in magnitude or 
quantity. Rather, what increases is the amount of qualitatively distinct psychic 
elements that are involved. There are no single sensations, not even simple ones, 
there are only multiplicities: collections of distinct elements involved in 
a sensation. In addition, since all psychic elements permeate one another, they do 
not admit to extensity. As Bergson hopes to show with his examples, one cannot 
clearly draw lines around sensations. It is impossible to experience exactly where 
anger stops and where frustration starts, or where the line between sadness and 
melancholy lies. All our sensations are permeating blends of psychic experiences. 
Intensity (of sensations) has nothing to do with magnitude (quantity), save for the 
quantity of qualitatively distinct elements that are involved. One can compare this 
to grabbing a very cold can of soda from the fridge. When holding it, it seems to 
become colder and colder, until we finally have to put the can down. Of course in 
reality, an increasing amount of distinct parts of one’s hand is becoming involved 
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with ‘being cold’ and it would be ridiculous to think that the can is actually 
getting colder. In the same sense, Bergson argues any sensation has to be 
understood in terms of waxing and waning, of constant permeation, blending and 
involvement, and not in terms of rigid beginnings and endings. 
6. Multiplicity and duration 
Having shown that sensations are not extended quantities, but 
heterogeneous multiplicities of permeating psychic states, Bergson then probes the 
nature of these multiplicities by examining the notion of ‘number’ (by which he 
means amounts), and this is where Bergson will start to get to the heart of Kant’s 
system.66 A number is a collection of units that are identical on whatever aspect 
makes them a collection. ‘Fifty sheep’ can only be called ‘fifty sheep’ because every 
single one of them is a sheep. In order for them to be ‘fifty sheep’, there has to be 
difference between them as well, the very minimum being the position they 
occupy in space. Bergson argues that ‘either we include them all in the same 
image, and it follows that we place them side by side in an ideal space, or else we 
repeat fifty times in succession the image of a single one.’67 So the idea of number 
necessarily requires the idea of space. Though there might not literally be a space 
(I do not have to mentally position every single sheep on my desk), this does not 
diminish the fact that ‘every clear idea of number implies a visual image in 
space.’68 Numbers are therefore quantitative multiplicities: collections that contain 
a certain distinct amount of discrete units in space. So, one battalion is 
a quantitative multiplicity of five companies, each company is a quantitative 
multiplicity of five platoons, and so on, and we can only make this distinction 
because we have the idea of space: ‘the very admission that it is [always] possible 
to divide the unit into as many parts as we like, shows that we regard [numbers] 
as extended.’69 Summing up: counting and number require juxtaposition in space. 
 Now, though material objects can be included in quantitative multiplicities, 
as they are extended in space and can be perceived simultaneously, ‘the case is no 
longer the same when we consider purely affective states.’70 According to Bergson, 
it is impossible to count psychic states, because in consciousness, one is 
‘confronted by a confused multiplicity of sensations and feelings.’71 It simply 
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makes no sense to say that one has ‘six happy’ or ‘eight angry’. Bergson 
emphasizes that psychic states are different kinds of multiplicities, not 
quantitative, but qualitative in nature. It is not possible to count them, because 
they all ‘permeate one another, and each of [them], for its part, takes up the whole 
soul [and] we cannot count them unless we represent them by homogeneous units 
which occupy separate positions in space and consequently no longer permeate 
one another.’72 That is, by counting or even naming sensations, one already loses 
track of what they truly are. Their names are nothing but symbolic representations 
in space. Also, if the true nature of psychic states is the heterogeneous, permeating 
multiplicity, then number and space must be anathema to it.73 That is, psychic 
states do not admit to amounts, cannot be set apart in extended space and cannot 
even be distinguished from one another: ‘states of consciousness, even when 
successive, permeate one another, and in the simplest of them the whole soul can 
be reflected.’74 Again, such permeation becomes clear when realizing that any 
attempt to separate ‘anger’, ‘frustration’, and ‘despair’ into clean-cut, distinct 
things is futile. They permeate one another, and, in a sense, reflect each other. 
Having established this, Bergson starts to make his real move to undercut 
the assumptions underlying Kant’s theory of freedom. He argues that we consider 
space to be ‘an empty homogeneous medium.’75 As has been shown, this is exactly 
how Kant perceives time. Time is what enables us to distinguish any number of 
identical and simultaneous sensations from one another. It allows us to make 
clean-cut distinctions and to think amounts. Bergson also points out that ‘when we 
speak of time, we generally think of a homogeneous medium in which our 
conscious states are ranged alongside one another.’76 This is strange, as this would 
allow the division, counting, and numbering of conscious states, which has, 
according to Bergson, just proved to be illegitimate. The solution, of course, 
presents itself automatically. Bergson argues that 
[...] if time […] is a medium in which our conscious states form a discrete series so 
as to admit of being counted, and if [our] conception of number ends in spreading 
out in space everything which can be directly counted, it is to be presumed that 
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time, understood in the sense of a medium in which we make distinctions and 
count, is nothing but space.77 
Or again: 
[...] if space is to be defined as the homogeneous, it seems that inversely every 
homogeneous and unbounded medium will be space. For, homogeneity consisting 
in the absence of every quality, it is hard to see how two forms of the 
homogeneous could be distinguished from one.78 
Like width, length, and depth, time as it is commonly understood is nothing more 
than another axis of space. Of course, if time is an axis of space, then psychic states 
are also not extended in time. That is, saying that one is first happy and then 
became angry is possible in reflection, but in experience one can never distinctly 
separate two psychic states and say that one ends and another one starts. Just like 
heterogeneous permeating psychic states do not admit to number on the ‘usual’ 
axes of space, neither do they do so on the ‘time’ axis of space.  
Separating conscious states in terms of space and time is an artificial move, 
mostly for the benefit of making conscious experience intelligible in terms of 
language. It must now be clear that this is not the mode in which consciousness 
truly exists according to Bergson. For Bergson, consciousness exists in what he 
calls duration: ‘pure duration [is] the form which the succession of our conscious 
states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its 
present state from its former states.’79 It consists in ‘interconnection and 
organization of elements, each one of which represents the whole, and cannot be 
distinguished or isolated from it except by abstract thought.’80 Duration is 
characterized by constant change, a constant ‘becoming’ of ourselves, and hence 
by ‘succession without mutual externality.’81 To better grasp the mode of duration 
in which consciousness truly exists, it is worth to quote at some length an example 
that Bergson gives concerning the way we could perceive a pendulum beating 
sixty seconds with sixty oscillations: 
If I picture these sixty oscillations to myself all at once by a single mental 
perception, I exclude by hypothesis the idea of a succession. I do not think of sixty 
strokes which succeed one another, but of sixty strokes on a fixed line, each one of 
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which symbolizes, so to speak, an oscillation of the pendulum. If, on the other 
hand, I wish to picture [them] in succession, but without altering the way they are 
produced in space, I […] think of each oscillation to the exclusion of the 
recollection of the preceding one, for space has preserved no trace of it; but by 
doing so I […] give up the attempt to think a succession or a duration. Now if, 
finally, I retain the recollection of the preceding oscillation together with the image 
of the present oscillation, one of two things will happen. Either I shall set the two 
images side by side, and then we fall back to [thinking in terms of space], or I shall 
perceive one in the other, each permeating the other and organizing themselves 
like the notes of a tune, so as to form what we shall call a continuous or qualitative 
multiplicity with no resemblance to number.82 
This example illustrates that according to Bergson, space, including the time axis, 
is homogeneous and knows only simultaneity, and that it is only in duration that 
succession takes place. That is, only by memories of previous states in their 
consciousness are human beings able to connect different occurrences in the world 
to each other: ‘[only] in duration, nothing is lost, as each moment stands under the 
sign of the entire flow of the past’83. Hence there cannot be real time in matter: 
[...] when I follow the movement of a hand on a clock, […] without […] the 
observer, there would be no real transition from one position of the hand to 
another: the interval of the durée exists only for us, and because of the mutual 
penetration of our conscious states; outside us one would find nothing but space, 
and thus simultaneities, of which one may not even say that they objectively 
succeed each other, as any succession is conceived of by comparing the present to 
the past.84 
Without the observer, each state of the world is completely distinct, and therefore 
nothing can be said to result from anything else: 
[...] each of the so-called successive states of the external world exists alone; their 
multiplicity is real only for a consciousness that can first retain them and then set 
them side by side externalizing them in relation to one another. If it retains them, it 
is because these distinct states of the external world give rise to states of 
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consciousness which permeate one another, imperceptibly organize themselves 
into a whole, and bind the past to the present by this very process of connection85. 
To put it shortly: ‘outside us, mutual externality without succession; within us, 
succession without mutual externality.’86 
Bergson uses the metaphors of the spool, the color spectrum, and the elastic 
band to get a better sense of duration within the limitations of language. First, 
imagine a tape rolling between two spools. This represents duration in the sense 
that consciousness is in a perpetual state of becoming: with every moment, it 
changes because something new is added to it. However, the image of the tape is 
still too homogeneous. Therefore, he adds the metaphor of the color spectrum, in 
which each section is qualitatively different from every other section. This 
represents duration as a heterogeneous multiplicity. Finally, he adds the metaphor 
of the elastic band, imagining it being stretched from every single point onto every 
single other point. This represents the permeation of states. So, the ‘unrolling 
of our duration [the tape between the spools] on one side resembles the unity of 
a movement which progresses [the elastic band], on the other hand a multiplicity 
of states spreading out [the color spectrum].’87 This turn to metaphors in order to 
grasp the notion of duration again illustrates how Bergson is constantly at odds 
with the very language he is forced to employ: 
[...] let us take our mind off the space subtending […] movement itself and 
concentrate solely on the movement itself, on the act of tension or extension, in 
short, on pure mobility. This time we shall have a more exact image of our 
development in duration. […] And yet the image will still be incomplete, and all 
comparison furthermore will be inadequate, because the unrolling of our duration 
in certain aspects resembles the unity of a movement which progresses, in others, 
a multiplicity of states spreading out, and because no metaphor can express one of 
the two aspects without sacrificing the other. If I evoke a spectrum of a thousand 
shades, I have before me a complete thing, whereas duration is the act of 
completing itself.88 
For Bergson, then, there is a real space, containing a width, length, depth, 
and time axis. In space, phenomena are present simultaneously. There is also 
a real duration, a heterogeneity of moments that permeate one another. In 
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duration, there is a succession of these moments, but it remains impossible to 
clearly distinguish these moments from each other. However, since the course of 
a life necessarily ‘unfolds’ within a spatially extended world, Bergson argues that 
we inevitably ‘translate’ moments of duration into terms that pertain to space and 
distinct amounts. For Bergson, language itself relies on space. Therefore, whenever 
one tries to articulate moments of duration, they are automatically molded into 
shapes that are intelligible in terms of space, that is, in terms of extension and 
amount. By perceiving objects that have clear beginnings and ends in space, we 
come to think of our own mental sensations as having these clear beginnings and 
ends as well. For example, we necessarily think of a moment of joy as something 
that starts at a given point (‘when I laid eyes upon the Mona Lisa’) and then ends 
at another one (‘when other visitors blocked my view’). It is when we relate such 
a moment of duration to a state in the world that we create the time-axis of space: 
‘duration [then] assumes the illusory form of a homogeneous medium, and the 
connecting link between […] space and duration, is simultaneity, which might be 
defined as the intersection of time and space.’89 In other words, time is what we 
create in order to ‘fit’ duration onto space, but the price paid is that true duration 
will then always be misrepresented, as its articulations in terms of time will 
always be ‘contaminated’ by space.  
In true duration, consciousness exists in states of permeating, 
heterogeneous multiplicity that do not allow for extension in time or space, and 
hence cannot be counted, organized, or numbered. Thus, sensations occur under 
what Bergson calls ‘two aspects: the one clear and precise, but impersonal, the 
other confused, ever changing, and inexpressible, because language cannot get 
hold of it without arresting its mobility or to fit it into its common-place forms 
without making it into public property.’90 In addition, Bergson warns that not all 
conscious states are incorporated into the second aspect. That is, many or even 
most sensations float on the surface of consciousness-in-duration, like dead leaves 
on the water of a pond. The more we affirm living in a world of extensive, distinct, 
concrete ideas and articulations, the more we remove ourselves from our deepest 
selves. These warnings foreshadow the theory of freedom that results from 
Bergson’s conception of consciousness as being outside of time and (its axis of) 
space. 
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7. Freedom in duration 
Finding that time is a man-made addition to space, our sole yet flawed way 
of articulating the succession of moments in duration or ‘real time’, Bergson now 
has reason to do away with Kant’s theory of freedom and, by proxy, the whole 
debate on the freedom of the will. The fundamental assumption that human 
consciousness resides on a homogeneous, infinite, and divisible ‘line’ of time has 
turned out to be an illusion. Time and representation of things within it is 
a human construct used to adapt conscious states ‘to the requirements of social life 
in general and language in particular.91 If time is artificial and duration is real, 
then there is no need for the Kantian escape to an intelligible realm. On the 
contrary, once we realize that time has nothing to do with the fundamental nature 
of human consciousness, we can stay well within nature when considering the 
question of human freedom. After all, the very thesis of determinism in nature 
rests upon a juxtaposition of states. As Bergson argues: ‘determinism represents 
the self as a collection of psychic states, the strongest of which exerts a prevailing 
influence and carries the others with it. This doctrine thus sharply distinguishes 
co-existing psychic phenomena from one another.’92 Determinism requires clear- 
-cut causes and distinct effects, for instance frustration causing anger. However, 
when we relate to conscious states in those terms, we are not talking about the 
states themselves, but their symbolic representations, the words that express them 
(poorly). That this is an illegitimate move becomes clearer when trying to 
articulate deep-rooted emotions like love. The harder we try, the more we notice 
that love is indeed a multiplicity of numerous heterogeneous psychic states, each 
one permeating the other, making it impossible to provide an adequate 
description or definition. As Bergson concludes: ‘there is no common measure 
between mind and language.’93 
 This is exactly where both determinists and non-determinists go wrong. As 
Bergson explains, they usually draw a series of conscious states from point M to 
point O. At point O, we have to make a choice between X and Y. This can be 
represented by two lines diverging from point O. When we choose X, the 
determinist will say that previous states necessitated the choice. The indeterminist 
will say that one could have chosen any of the two branches. The mistake they 
both make is assuming that in deliberation, the feelings, desires and sensations 
associated with X and those associated with Y are distinct, different things. 
Bergson argues that the aforementioned arguments prove that ‘the very question 
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[of which side of the debate is right] is meaningless, because there is no line MO, 
no point O, no path OX, no direction OY. To ask such a question is to admit the 
possibility of adequately representing time by space and a succession by 
a simultaneity.94 The usual participants of the debate think that deliberating 
a choice lies in comparing two distinct, separate sets of motivations. In truth, while 
deliberation is going on, the self changes and constantly modifies. This means that 
a dynamic series of permeating states is formed, leading ‘by a natural evolution to 
a free act.’95 After all, if the self would not grow and change in the process of 
deliberation, but merely review the data presented to it, how could it ever make 
a choice? Participants in the debate represent the deliberation as an oscillation in 
time, and therefore in space, which has nothing to do with the inherent nature of 
human consciousness. For Bergson, this is also why one can never fully predict 
another man’s thoughts and actions: at best, they can be anticipated. He 
emphasizes that the only way of predicting another man’s actions would be to 
assume not only his coordinates in space, but also to assume his consciousness in 
duration, including his memories, which would in sum amount to being that other 
man. This would no longer boil down to predicting, but simply be acting. As 
Harris argues, ‘actual prediction is possible only if some antecedent occurs again 
and again, but that is impossible in [duration].’96 Again, duration and 
consciousness residing within it do not allow for space and its time-aspect, 
therefore the very notion of causality as it is usually understood is utterly 
meaningless for Bergson. Duration and its modes of perpetual change and 
movement cannot be divided. Bergson compares this to a melody, in the sense 
that, like duration, a melody is constituted by change as such, without a thing, 
a second term, that it is departing from or arriving at. 
Having shown how the ‘usual suspects’ of the free will debate are 
misguided, Bergson posits his own conception of freedom, stating that freedom is 
‘the relation of the concrete self to the act which it performs.’97 We are free because 
consciousness endures, because it is a constant becoming, unrestrained by space 
and its time axis. We are free ‘when our acts spring from our whole personality, 
when they express it, when they have that indefinable resemblance to it which one 
sometimes finds between the artist and his work.’98 Therefore, freedom admits to 
intensities and, again, Bergson insists that not all conscious states blend with 
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another ‘as raindrops on the water of a lake.’99 An example that he gives is that of 
an education that is not properly assimilated into one’s character. It is only when 
the whole soul acts that an act can be free for Bergson, because only then does it 
emerge from the whole of consciousness-in-duration. Thus understood, free acts 
are exceptional, because we 
[...] generally perceive our own self by refraction through space, that our conscious 
states crystallize into words, and that our living and concrete self thus gets 
covered with an outer crust of clean-cut psychic states, which are separated from 
one another and consequently fixed.100 
In other words: the more our actions spring forth from habit, from social 
conventions, and from routine, the less free they are, because they are then 
embedded in the everyday life of space and its time axis. On the contrary, it is at 
‘the great and solemn crisis […] that we choose in defiance of what is 
conventionally called a motive, and this absence of any tangible reason is the more 
striking the deeper our freedom goes.’101 Somewhat disappointingly, Bergson 
concludes that any attempt to further explain freedom will actually diminish it, as 
‘any positive definition of freedom will ensure the victory of determinism.’102 
After all, the entire effort was to demonstrate how free consciousness resides in 
duration, which is outside time, the space-axis of time, and language as a space- 
-based medium. Kolakowski has also noted this difficulty (or impossibility) in 
trying to elaborate on Bergson’s theory of freedom: ‘in Bergson’s analysis freedom 
is both unquestionably certain and utterly unprovable in the sense which the word 
‘to prove’ has acquired in scientific inquiry.’103 As Bergson concludes: 
[…] to sum up; every demand for explanation in regard to freedom comes back, 
without our suspecting it, to the following question: “can time be adequately 
represented by space?”. To which we answer: Yes, if you are dealing with time 
flown; No, if you speak of time flowing. Now, the free act takes place in 
time which is flowing and not in time which has already flown. Freedom is 
therefore a fact, and among the facts which we observe there is none clearer. All 
the difficulties of the problem, and the problem itself, arise from the desire to 
endow duration with the same attributes as extensity, to interpret a succession by 
                                                 
99 Ibidem, p. 166. 
100 Ibidem, p. 167. 
101 Ibidem, p. 170. 
102 Ibidem, p. 219. 
103 Kolakowski [1985] p. 22. 
Arjen Kleinherenbrink ◦ Time, duration and freedom – Bergson’s critical move against... 
 226 
a simultaneity and to express the idea of freedom in a language into which it is 
obviously untranslatable.’104 
As one can imagine, this error perceived by Bergson has far wider ramifications 
than just the debate on free will. Indeed, he has argued for an entire ‘philosophy 
which sees duration in the very stuff of reality.’105 
8. Conclusions 
The preceding sections have emphasized that Kant’s theory of freedom 
rests upon a fundamental assumption concerning time. In Time and free will, 
Bergson criticizes this assumption, arguing that it, underlying not just Kant’s 
theory but the entire debate on free will, renders both determinist positions and 
their rival theories meaningless. He demonstrates how time is not a temporal, but 
a spatial notion, an argument that allows him to develop his own notions of 
duration and freedom.106 In the conclusion to Time and free will, Bergson states 
that ‘Kant’s greatest mistake was to take time as a homogeneous medium.’107 Kant 
ignored that duration is ‘moments inside one another’, and that when it assumes 
the form of a homogeneous whole, it is because it is expressed in space as the mere 
symbolic representation of the true ego. Kant thought that ‘consciousness was 
incapable of perceiving psychic states otherwise than by juxtaposition, forgetting 
that a medium in which these states are set side by side and distinguished from 
one another is of course space, and not duration.’108 This led him to believe that 
our inner and the outer world are subjected to the same causal relations. He 
                                                 
104 Bergson [2001] p. 221. 
105 Bergson [1998] p. 272. 
106 Time and free will is a psychological project, focusing almost exclusively on duration as a lived 
experience versus time as a measured quantity. In Matter and memory and further work, Bergson 
investigates the possibility of extending duration into matter, making it ‘the variable essence of 
things’ (Deleuze [1988] p. 34). Or as Bergson asserts ‘homogeneous space and homogeneous time 
are […] neither properties of things nor essential conditions of our faculty of knowing them’ [1991] 
p. 21. By the time of Creative evolution, he posits duration as a characteristic immanent to the 
universe, making our psychological duration merely one aspect or case of a wider notion (Ansell 
Pearson, Mullarkey [2002] pp. 9–12, 37). As a consequence, Bergson will also dispute the 
homogeneity of space understood as empty form (see Mullarkey [2000] for an elaboration on this 
theme). However, it is important to note that none of these developments in Bergson’s thinking 
deviate from his initial argument on time and the consequences for freedom. For example, Matter 
and memory still squarely affirms that the tension of duration determines the measure of freedom 
[1991] p. 247–248. The conclusion to Matter and memory as a whole clearly illustrates how 
Bergson’s further work is still pinned on the initial move of moving time away from succession 
and into duration in Time and free will. Similarly, the notion of freedom that finds its inception in 
Time and free will permeates the entirety of Creative evolution. 
107 Bergson [2001] p. 232. 
108 Ibidem. 
Arjen Kleinherenbrink ◦ Time, duration and freedom – Bergson’s critical move against... 
 227 
therefore had to elevate freedom to the sphere of the noumena. According to 
Bergson, this Kantian self is properly outside of space, but it is also outside of 
duration, ‘and therefore out of the reach of our faculty of knowledge [while] the 
truth is that we perceive [the] self whenever, by a strenuous effort of reflection, we 
turn our eyes from the shadow which follows us and retire into ourselves.’109 The 
true self resides in duration, a qualitative multiplicity with no likeness to number, 
a heterogeneity with no distinct qualities. Duration is the stuff out of which 
conscious existence is made; ‘for a conscious being, to exist is to change and to 
change is to endure.’110 Whereas Kant built his theory of freedom on the 
assumption that there is time in nature, Bergson shows that in nature, there is no 
time. There is only space and duration, and time only exists as an artificial tool to 
support language and everyday existence, spawned by man from a mixture of 
space and duration and then added to space as a fourth axis. For Bergson, free acts 
therefore do not emerge from adhering to reason. It is much more likely that well- 
-reasoned actions are part of our superficial self, our character insofar as it resides 
within habit, routine, and the limits of language. This latter self is the mere ‘social 
representation’ of the true self that exists in a state of constant originality, 
creativity, and becoming.111 The implication of Bergson’s position is therefore that 
‘the future does not exist in the way that, for a determinist, events are mere 
unfolding of reality already hidden in existing conditions. In contrast, life is 
a creative process, characterized by unpredictability and newness.’112 
According to Bergson, it thus turns out that it is not just compatibilism that 
is a ‘wretched subterfuge’, but the entire debate on free will as such, including 
Kant’s own theory of freedom. Moreover, the latter should be considered an 
abomination, because in addition to a misconception of time, it also imposes the 
same form of the moral law on our actions for all eternity, whereas for Bergson, 
the fundamental characteristic of life is unpredictability, surprise, and originality. 
By introducing duration, Bergson attempts to liberate us from the constraints of 
the debate on free will, as well as from ‘scientism, mechanism, determinism, 
associative materialism and positivism.’113 Even though he posits freedom as 
a fundamental condition of consciousness in duration, we should, however, 
always remember that for Bergson, the free act is exceptionally rare, as it requires 
‘the effort to contract as much of our own duration as possible and to push it into 
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the present, thereby creating a future that is absolutely new.’114 In addition, we 
pay the price of hardly knowing our true selves, as we ‘mostly perceive nothing 
but the outward display of our mental states. We catch only the impersonal aspect 
of our feelings, and that aspect which speech has set down. Thus, even in our own 
individual, individuality escapes us.’115 For Bergson however, such is life. 
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